Masonry Magazine January 1974 Page.27
MCAA Information
(Continued from page 15) which would be binding on the principals. In this connection, the Employer maintains that the 1962 interunion agreement between the Iron Workers and the Bricklayers, alleged by the Iron Workers to be controlling, has been violated by both of these Unions in the past and there is no convincing evidence to demonstrate that this agreement is operative in the Houston, Texas, area, the situs of the instant dispute.
Also, the Employer notes that it has never consented to be bound by this agreement. On the merits of the dispute, the Employer argues that it assigned the work incidental to the Installation of these prefabricated wall panels to employees represented by the Bricklayers because they have repeatedly shown that they can perform the work more safely, economically, and capably than those represented by Iron Workers. The Bricklayers position is essentially the same as that of the Employer.
The Iron Workers argues that this this dispute should not be resolved by the Board since all parties are bound by agreements providing machinery for the adjustment of jurisdictional disputes. Alternately, the Iron Workers asserts that its members are able to perform the disputed work as efficiently and safely as those of Bricklayers, particularly as it encompasses the functions of rigging, hooking on, signaling, and landing which are involved in the installation of these preassembled brick wall panels.
It also claims that an award in its favor is dictated by the 1962 agreement executed by International officials of the Iron Workers and Bricklayers apportioning between these Unions the work involved in the erection "of all types of pre-cast, pre-stressed concrete stone, or imitation stone, or other fabricated units when installed as wall panels by means of bolting and/or welding to structural steel or concrete frame construction."
D. Applicability of the Statute
Before the Board may proceed with a determination of dispute pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act, it must be convinced that there is reasonable cause to believe that Section 8(a)(4)(D) has been violated.
The first issue to be resolved arises from the Iron Workers claim that there exists an agreed-upon procedure for resolving this dispute which is binding on all the parties. In this connection, the evidence shows that the Employer is an associate member of the Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. (AGC), and a party to the existing collective-bargaining agreement between AGC and the Iron Workers. This agreement does not expressly delineate the work jurisdiction of Iron Workers, but it does provide that in the event of jurisdictional disputes occurring between the signatories such contingencies shall be submitted either to the National Joint Board" or "to any agency established by law or mutual agreement to settle such disputes." The Iron Workers contends that the foregoing language in the agreement obligates the Employer to submit such disputes to the National Joint Board. However, in a prior proceeding involving these same parties, we rejected this identical contention, pointing out that the aforestated language of the agreement contemplates alternative methods for the resolution of such disputes, including the submission of the dispute to this Agency; and, thus, there is no mandatory requirement that disputes of this nature be submitted to the National Joint Board.
Accordingly, we find that there is no agreed-upon method for resolving this dispute which is binding on the parties, and hence, this dispute is properly before the Board.
As already shown by the description of the background of this dispute, the record shows that the Iron Workers demanded that the Employer reassign part of the work connected with the installation of prefabricated brick wall panels on the Sperry-Rand Building job to Iron Workers. Following this demand, on December 17, 18, and 19, 1973, the Respondent picketed the jobsite in an attempt to coerce compliance with its work demand.
4. The present National Joint Board is denominated as the New Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes Board.
5. Iron Workers Union Local No. 84 (Smith Southern Corporation), supra.
masonry
Nov./Dec., 1974
Accordingly, we find that there is reasonable cause to believe that violations of Section 8(a) (4) (D) have occurred, and that the dispute is properly before the Board for determination under Section 10(k) of the Act.
E. Merits of the Dispute
Section 10(k) of the Act requires the Board to make an affirmative award of the disputed work after duly considering all of the relevant factors. As the Board has stated, its determination in a jurisdictional dispute case is an act of judgment based upon common sense and experience in measuring the weight to be accorded various factors."
1. Certifications
The labor organizations involved in this case have not been certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative for a unit, or units, of the Employer's employees.
2. Collective-Bargaining Agreements
The Employer is a member of the Mason Contractors Association of America (MCAA) and is bound by the current labor agreement in effect between (MCAA) and the Bricklayers parent International Union. Article IV, paragraph c, of this agreement states:
the Employers agree to assign [to the Bricklayers] all work including, but not limited to, all masonry (brick and concrete masonry units made from any materials, stone, marble, structural tile, terra cotta, prefabricated or pre-assembled components or panels, glass blocks, all forms of substitute materials thereto) utilized in all forms of construction, maintenance, repair and renovation. [Emphasis supplied.]
As previously indicated, the Employer, through its membership in the Houston Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., also has a collective-bargaining agreement with the Iron Workers. However, that agreement does not expressly delineate the work jurisdiction of the Iron Workers and, as a practical matter, no ironworkers are being carried on the Employer's payroll for this job.
Accordingly, we conclude that the collective-bargaining agreement between the Employer and the Bricklayers favors an award of the disputed work to members of that Union.
3. The Interunion Agreement
The Iron Workers, in claiming the disputed work, lays great stress upon an agreement executed in December, 1962, between the International presidents of the Bricklayers and the Iron Workers Union. We have already decided in the previous case involving these parties that this interunion agreement does not serve to justify the Iron Workers 8(b) (4) (D) action in seeking to enforce its demand for the work in dispute. We find nothing in the instant record to justify any modification of the Board's prior conclusion. No evidence has been adduced to show that the Employer ever consented to be bound by this agreement between these two labor organizations. It is now settled beyond doubt that an employer picketed in the context of a jurisdictional dispute is a necessary party to the dispute for purposes of Section 10(k) of the Act."
Not only does the evidence fail to establish that the Employer is in any way bound by this interunion agreement, there is no showing that the agreement has generally been abided by in the Houston, Texas, area. Consequently, we find that the 1962 agreement between the Iron Workers and Bricklayers is not a factor to which weight can be given in determining the merits of this dispute.
(Please turn page)
6. NLRB v. Radio and Television Broadcasting Engineers Union, Local 1212, IBEW (Columbia Broadcasting System), 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
7. International Association of Machinists, Lodge No. 1743, AFL-CIO (J. A. Jones Construction Company), 135 NLRB 1402 (1962).
8. 208 NLRB No. 36, supra.
9. NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79, Operating Plasterers and Cement Masons International Association (Southwestern Construction Company), 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
27